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ABSTRACT 
JORGE VELA: Radical Innovation in the Transatlantic Economy: Is a Silicon Valley in Europe 
Possible? 
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe, John Stephens, and Gary Marks) 
 
In this paper I will discuss the role of institutional frameworks and public policy in 
spurring technological, “radical” innovation in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) such as 
France.  The main question asked is whether high-technology start-ups can be successful in 
Europe.  This study will start by first explaining in detail the elements of the successful “Silicon 
Valley” model of technological innovation.  I will then examine institutional frameworks in both 
CMEs and in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) such as the U.S. and analyze the factors that are 
relevant to technological innovation.  Building on this information, the third section will provide 
an analysis of the possibilities for radical innovation in Europe.  Finally, this study will examine 
these possibilities through a case study of France.  Public policy starting in the 1990s to the 
present will be given special attention, and examples will be drawn to prove that radical 
innovation is possible in Europe. 
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PREFACE 
I wrote this thesis with the purpose of exploring a topic that has interested me ever since I 
started studying Europe as an undergraduate.  I had two main goals in writing this text.  First, I 
wanted to prove that the successful technological economy that has revolutionized American 
industry can also be encouraged and developed in other parts of the world.  In particular, I wanted 
to prove that Europe has what it takes to encourage technological innovation, too.  I also wanted 
to point out the accomplishments that Europe has already achieved.  For example, while many 
may recognize technology giants such as Google and Microsoft as American, few people know 
that the internet application Skype originated in Luxembourg or that the French pioneered an 
early Internet-like communications technology called Minitel.  It is through this study that I want 
to dispel the notion of Europe as a technological laggard.  Second, I also hope that this thesis will 
be used to further knowledge about our transatlantic partners.  I believe that learning about others 
is important to learning about ourselves, and thus I hope that papers like this one can be used to 
further knowledge about how to improve both public policy at home and cooperation abroad. 
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Introduction 
The United States and the European Union have the largest economies in the world, and 
the transatlantic economy is the world’s most important in almost every sense.  Thus, leaders on 
both sides of the Atlantic understand it is important that the US and the EU work together to 
deepen transatlantic economic relations, bolster the competitiveness of EU and US firms, support 
job creation and promote economic recovery on both sides of the Atlantic.  The US and EU 
economies are already intimately intertwined.  European investment accounts for 3.6 million jobs 
and over 71% of foreign investment in the United States; American investment plays an equally 
important role in Europe.  The value of goods and services traded in both directions amounts to 
approximately $900 billion annually.  Without a doubt, Europe and the U.S. are each others´ 
primary commercial partner. 
Yet this strong economic relationship hides a growing economic divergence on both sides 
of the Atlantic.  While the US economy remains the most technologically innovative in the world, 
European innovation is focused mainly on manufactured and consumer goods.  America values 
the success of its world-beating biotechnology and information technology start-ups which are 
incubated at Silicon Valley and at other technology clusters and which rely on radical 
innovation—that is to say, single, strategy-changing breakthroughs or discoveries—to succeed in 
the market.  Meanwhile, European industrial breakthroughs are focused mainly on manufacturing 
sectors such as automobiles, trains, machinery and other sectors that rely on incremental 
innovation for productivity improvement.  This has led many academics to argue that the 
American and European economies are more complementary than in direct competition with one 
another.  At the same time, policymakers in Europe are intent on terminating the American 
dominance of high-technology sectors.  Given that the 2002 Lisbon Agenda for economic
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development hopes to make Europe the strongest “knowledge-based economy in the world,” 
based on human capital, technology and growth from innovation, many think that such a 
challenge is imperative.  Yet many argue that European research and higher education have not 
attained the goals necessary to propel Europe as a high-technology hub.  In the meantime, the 
financial crisis has put into perspective the need for economies to diversify and innovate in order 
to stay competitive for the future. 
Although it is difficult to speak of European economies as non-innovative, one point is 
certain: Europe is struggling to recreate the so-called “Silicon Valley model” of innovation, based 
on high levels of venture capital, helpful corporate governance arrangements, high-powered 
performance incentives for managers and employees, and flexible labor markets.  This model is 
credited with radical innovation breakthroughs prevalent in industries such as software, 
biotechnology, and information technology.  Europe’s failure to recreate this model is part of the 
reason why by the mid-1990s most European economies found themselves lagging behind the 
United States in the aforementioned “new economy” sectors.  But what is the reality of the 
situation?  Are Europe’s economies truly behind the United States in the race for innovation?  Or 
do they just innovate in different sectors and/or in different ways?  Many political scientists 
believe that the institutional frameworks of nations are crucial in understanding the differences in 
the results obtained on both sides of the Atlantic.  Following this “varieties of capitalism” 
approach, we will explore the differences that arise from the fact that the U.S. is a market-
oriented economy whereas European economies are “corporatist.”  It is clear that the elements 
leading to the successful uptake of the Silicon Valley model—that is, venture capital available to 
finance projects, corporate legal governance arrangements, shareholder performance incentives, 
and flexible labor markets—are more prevalent in the liberal market economy (LME) than in 
coordinated market economies (CME).  Most continental European economies possess none of 
these qualities.  European companies are generally financed and governed along starkly different 
models than the model employed at Silicon Valley.  Given their institutional framework, scholars 
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argue that most European economies would have to either invent new governance institutions 
associated with “new economy” sectors from scratch or transform existing institutions to meet the 
needs of high-tech start-ups. 
Despite its institutional framework, can Europe still create a knowledge-based economy 
largely centered on new economy industries?  In line with this thought, this study asks one central 
question: Can European governments successfully deploy policies to incubate the Silicon Valley 
model of organizing companies and, with it, encourage industrial success in biotechnology, 
software and other “radical innovation” industries?  Or is the lack of success the result of long-
standing national institutional frameworks that cannot be adopted to encourage commercial 
technological innovation?  In short, the purpose of this study is to analyze the viability of the 
Silicon Valley model of radical innovation in Europe’s CMEs.  Our hypothesis is that radical 
innovation in European CMEs faces three fundamental obstacles that stem from the institutional 
framework in place in most continental European states.  First, rigid European labor markets as 
well as corporate and payroll legal regulations discourage industrial ventures.  Second, 
entrepreneurship and risk-taking are not a norm in Europe, in contrast with a Silicon Valley 
culture that venerates risk-taking.  This can be seen in the conservative financing as well as the 
stakeholder models characteristic of most European ventures.  Lastly, the fragmentation of the 
European single market is a massive logistical problem that spreads resources too thin to be able 
concentrate knowledge.1. This study will focus on the first two reasons given their relevance to 
institutional frameworks.  Despite these obstacles, however, we believe that public policy 
changes in European CMEs can stimulate the creation of radical innovation in these economies, 
and we will use France as a case study to prove this point. 
                                                          
1
 For more information on the fragmentation of the European single market for research, read Crescenzi, 
Riccardo et al. (2007). The Geographical Processes Behind Innovation: A Europe-Untied States 
Comparative Analysis. Working Paper No. 81. Site: 
http://host.uniroma3.it/dipartimenti/economia/pdf/WP81.pdf. 
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We will explore transatlantic innovation in three sections.  First, we will explain in detail 
the Silicon Valley model of radical innovation.  Second, we will analyze the institutional 
frameworks of the U.S. and continental European economies in detail.  In this section, we will use 
Germany as an example of a European economy since it is the most typical CME, Europe’s 
largest economy, and both the world’s biggest exporter and the biggest R&D expender in Europe.  
Finally, we will analyze if European economies can implement the Silicon Valley model—that is, 
how European economies innovate.  We will do this through a case study of France, and 
consequently this section will pay special attention to the market-related change that has occurred 
in that country and which has propelled the Paris region to the top of the R&D charts in Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Silicon Valley Model 
 Before delving into a study of institutional frameworks and their effects on the innovative 
capacities of national economies, we must first define the Silicon Valley model which is one of 
the principal points of our study.  This Silicon Valley model refers to a relatively standardized set 
of financing, governance, and organizational techniques used to package entrepreneurial ideas 
into new ventures.  These techniques have been developed to manage the risks inherent with new 
technology industries such as biotechnology, software, and information technology.2  The model 
is essentially one that supports entrepreneurship as well as innovation in industries that depend 
heavily on technological breakthroughs for financial success.  It is a model based on high levels 
of venture capital, supportive corporate governance arrangements, high-powered performance 
incentives for managers and employees, and flexible labor markets.  Radically innovative firms in 
these industries, in turn, are often small start-ups organized along business models that possess 
three important competencies that require further explanation: the management of high-risk 
finance, the ability to tap into human resources from an embedded social network and a flexible 
labor market, and the creation of sufficiently high-powered incentives for personnel.3 
The first characteristic of Silicon Valley innovative firms is that they often create 
enormous financial returns and rely on risk-hungry investors for funding.  The financial 
premiums at start-ups are due to the substantial financial risks produced by high-technological 
volatility, reliance on often unproven business models, and the danger of losing innovation races 
with competitors.  In addition, technology start-ups also generally have high “burn rates”
                                                          
2
 Saxenian, Anna Lee (1994). Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128. 
 
3
 Casper, Steven (2007). Creating Silicon Valley in Europe: Public Policy towards New Technology 
Industries. P. 15. 
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generated by large R&D costs coupled with low profitability during the early phases of a firm’s 
development.  These risks make it difficult for most start-ups to obtain credit from traditional 
lenders.  Therefore, most startups rely on venture capitalists (VCs) and then later on the 
investment banking community and third-party investors through stock offerings for investment 
funds.  In return, venture capitalists usually demand a strong hand in the governance of firms.  
Venture capital funding also impacts the strategic goals of start-ups by forcing the latter to have 
an orientation toward profitable markets in order to increase the viability of liquidating 
investments via initial public offerings (IPOs) or acquisitions by rival established firms.4 
The second characteristic of Silicon Valley firms is their ability to tap into an embedded 
social network within a flexible labor market.  Given the fast-paced and competitive nature of 
high-technology industries, managers need flexibility when it comes to hiring staff.  To achieve 
this flexibility, managers must have access to a pool of technology specialists with expertise in 
particular areas that can quickly be recruited to work on projects.  The success of these managers 
is partly based on their ability to entice skilled personnel to leave lucrative, “safe” positions in 
established firms in order to join new ventures.  The presence of flexible labor markets in 
regional technology clusters such as Silicon Valley is essential to this strategy.  In fact, regional 
technology clusters exist partially as a conduit by which social networks linking agglomerations 
of firms can develop.  Within successful clusters, the strength of social networks makes it “safe” 
for individuals to change positions.5  In Silicon Valley, moving from job to job is not disruptive 
of personal and professional ties as it is elsewhere, argues Saxenian.6  It is thus no surprise that 
staff mobility within entrepreneurial start-ups is generally higher than at established firms. 
                                                          
4
 Ibid. P. 21. 
 
5
 Ibid. Pp. 22-24. 
 
6
 Saxenian, Anna Lee (1994). Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128. P. 35. 
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The third characteristic of the Silicon Valley business model are the high-powered 
incentives used to attract exceptional employees.  Successful Silicon Valley start-ups are 
associated with generating huge financial profits, and as a result, employees of successful 
technology start-ups are given financial rewards that far exceed those for equally skilled 
personnel working within established firms.  These incentives are partially a response to the 
demanding work conditions associated with young start-ups trying to quickly innovate in highly 
competitive markets.  In addition, high-powered incentives are also a response to risky 
knowledge characteristics within radically innovative industries.  Most key discoveries within 
technology firms can be exploited by founding a new firm; therefore, large financial incentives 
are used to reduce holdup of innovations by persuading scientists or engineers to remain and 
work for a successful start-up.  Radically innovative firms employ performance-based incentive 
schemes and employee ownership plans to reduce holdup risks and induce employees to commit 
to intense work responsibilities.  Since most new technology firms have well-defined goals, large 
bonuses and stock options, can be tied to their achievement.  The small size of most start-ups, 
particularly before initial success is achieved, increases the strength of ownership incentives.  The 
existence of stock option grants in early-stage firms that have achieved success and obtained IPOs 
on the stock market has created huge sums of wealth for key employees.  Distributing ownership 
of the firm across key employees and managers thus creates extremely high-powered incentives 
to work intensively within a firm.7 
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 Casper, Steven (2007). Creating Silicon Valley in Europe: Public Policy towards New Technology 
Industries. Pp. 24-25. 
Institutional Frameworks and Innovation: The Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
The revered Silicon Valley model described in detail above is closely associated with the 
biotechnology and information and communication (ICT) industries found in American research 
clusters.  Although continental Europe also possesses these industries, these sectors and their 
impact on the national European economies are on average much smaller than in the United 
States.  Therefore, it is important to question why the Silicon Valley model is highly diffused in 
certain geographical regions of the world and why its presence is more limited in others. 
Political scientists and economists studying corporate governance and welfare states 
argue that institutional frameworks within which firms operate is a central factor in explaining the 
structure of national economies.  Their “varieties of capitalism” approach contains a positive 
theory of why divergence in the structure of American and European economies exists.  In 
particular, the approach posits that divergence exists because specific national institutional 
frameworks create performance advantages for companies specializing in some industries, while 
creating obstacles in others.  According to this logic, countries “develop patterns of industry 
specialization that conform to their comparative institutional advantage.”8  Thus, the main reason 
for selecting the varieties of capitalism approach is its usefulness in exploring how institutions 
impact and how firms and other actors strategize within their economy and its governance rules. 
The varieties of capitalism approach makes clear distinctions between liberal market 
economies (LMEs) found in the US and the UK and coordinated market economies (CMEs) 
found in European states such as France and Germany (Soskice 1997).  The approach explains the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of each set of institutional frameworks in organizing the
                                                          
8
 Hall, Peter A. and Soskice, David (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. 
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economy.  The LME model, a shareholder-dominated model, encourages the diffusion of each of 
the key practices associated with Silicon Valley firms.  In particular, the success of Silicon Valley 
type firms in the US is the result of the existence of a financial system that encourages venture 
capital, corporate governance laws facilitating high-powered incentives structures within firms, 
and deregulated labor markets that encourage the generation of flexible labor markets.  By 
contrast, most large continental European economies have developed elements of a stakeholder or 
“coordinated” model of capitalism.  It is believed that national institutional frameworks within 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) can encourage strong industrial performance while 
imposing a system of “beneficial constraints” on companies by encouraging long-term 
employment and, with it, large company investments in industrial training and more consultative 
patterns of company organization common to German capitalism.  This more collaborative model 
of company organization was buffeted by a system of financing focused more on bank credits 
than capital market financing, linked to stakeholder systems of company law which gave 
company insiders, including union representatives, seats on most company boards.9  The chart 
below highlights the main differences between these two types of institutional frameworks: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Casper, Steven (2007). Creating Silicon Valley in Europe: Public Policy towards New Technology 
Industries. P. 3. 
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Institutional framework architectures in CMEs and LMEs10 
 LMEs CMEs 
Labor Law Liberal (decentralized wage 
bargaining; competition clauses 
struck down by courts); few barriers 
to employee turnover. 
Regulative (coordinated system of 
wage bargaining; competition clauses 
enforced); bias toward long-term 
employee careers in companies. 
Company Law Shareholder system (minimal legal 
constraints on company 
organization). 
Stakeholder system (two-tier board 
system and codetermination rights for 
employees). 
Skill Formation Skill formation: No systematized 
apprenticeship system for vocational 
skills.  Links between most 
universities and firms almost 
exclusively limited to R&D activities 
and R&D personnel. 
Organized apprenticeship system with 
substantial involvement from industry.  
Close links between industry and 
technical universities in designing 
curriculum and research. 
Financial 
System 
Primarily capital-market system, 
closely linked to market for corporate 
control and financial ownership and 
control of firms. 
Primarily bank based with close links 
to stakeholder system of corporate 
governance; limited hostile market for 
corporate control. 
 
 
From this perspective, the appeal of the Silicon Valley model of organizing new 
technology firms represents a strong test to the varieties of capitalism theoretical approach.  This 
section will establish the elements leading to a successful uptake of the Silicon Valley model in 
                                                          
10
 Table borrowed from Casper, Steven (2007). Creating Silicon Valley in Europe: Public Policy towards 
New Technology Industries. P. 27. 
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national economies through the use of a “varieties of capitalism” approach to explain the different 
developments in technology innovation that occur in the United States and Europe.  The first 
subset of this section focuses on the institutional characteristics a liberal market economy (LME), 
with specific attention on the architecture found in the United States.  In the second subset, the 
LME model is contrasted with the coordinated market economies (CME) model of organization 
typical of large continental European nations.  The different governmental and nongovernmental 
institutions available in both are discussed in depth. 
 
The Institutional Framework of Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) 
 LMEs are characterized by shareholder-dominated corporate governance that favors 
high-powered incentives, extensive access to venture capital, largely deregulated labor markets, 
and low levels of firm-specific skill formation.  Shareholder-dominated corporate governance is 
written in company law and property rights that are primarily financial in nature.  At the firm 
level, owners (the shareholders) enjoy a high amount of autonomy in governing the firm.  No 
legally stipulated rights of board representation for employees or other stakeholders in the 
company (e.g. the government) exist.  Company boards are composed of the main shareholders 
and have a large amount of autonomy within the firm.  One of the most common policies 
associated with this shareholder-dominated tradition is the creation of high-powered incentives 
for top management.  This comes in the form of high salaries, the awarding of company shares, 
and stock options included in financial packages.  Large bonuses in any or all of these forms 
create opportunities for top performers to quickly advance through firms, and at the same time 
reinforce the unilateral decision-making of the board.  While this system rewards success 
handsomely, it also allows boards to quickly remove top managers deemed underperforming.11 
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 Casper, Steven (2007). Creating Silicon Valley in Europe: Public Policy towards New Technology 
Industries. P. 27. 
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Shareholder-dominated corporate governance in LMEs is complemented by the existence 
of large capital markets that can fund the activities of companies.  Given the extensive access to 
funds, company formation and levels of entrepreneurship and creative management are generally 
high in LMEs.12  Entrepreneurs in LMEs are often not deterred by substantial capital 
requirements when developing products and ideas.  Since many of these entrepreneurs do not 
have sufficient funds to sustain projects during their formative stages, they must seek outside 
financing.  The extensive access to venture capital—the private equity that individual or group 
investors make available to young companies seeking launch and/or early development 
financing—enjoyed by start-ups makes these projects feasible and attractive depending on the 
potential for success.  Such financing tends to be short-term in nature, meaning that the value of 
company shares will rapidly decline if firms fail to meet growth or profitability goals or if 
products expectations fail to materialize in the marketplace.  This system is reinforced by an 
active marketplace for corporate control, suggesting that controlling shareholdings in failing firms 
can easily be bought by other groups, who can then engage in radical restructuring including the 
hiring and firing of senior management.   Companies that do meet growth or profitability 
expectations can raise substantial new funds through additional stock offerings or can use their 
shares as currency for acquisitions. 
To support unilateral decision-making at shareholder-dominated companies and high 
employee turnover, LMEs possess deregulated labor markets.  To preserve flexibility, top 
management at most firms offer limited employment contracts to managers and skilled personnel.  
A corporate governance system focused on short-term incentive contracts reinforces this system.  
Extensive career mobility also permeates the ranks of middle management and skilled personnel.  
In addition, company law in LMEs does not restrict the mobility of skilled personnel within a 
given industry.  Courts often ignore “competition clauses” inserted into employment contracts to 
                                                          
12
 For more info on entrepreneurship and creative management in LMEs, read Koepp, Rob (2002). Clusters 
of Creativity: Enduring Lessons on Innovation and Entrepreneurship from Silicon Valley and Silicon Fen. 
& Drucker, Peter F. (2006). Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 
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prevent poaching.   Therefore, poaching of personnel is widespread.13  At the same time, strong 
informal and formal networking, especially in clusters like Silicon Valley, means that inter-firm 
mobility is naturally high and that the risk of taking on short-term employment contracts does not 
dissuade employees. 
As a result of short-term employment norms, education and skill formation are not firm-
specific but rather general.  The corporate governance structures of most public companies make 
it difficult for them to credibly offer long-term employment, and thus employees become 
unwilling to undertake roles within companies that lead to what economists call firm-specific 
skills, or knowledge that is not easily transferable to another company.  At the same time, high 
employee turnover and poaching of personnel create incentives against significant company 
investment in the skills of their employees as well as a reliance on organization routines drawing 
on general skills that can be purchased in the marketplace.  This leads to a lack of industry 
involvement in apprenticeships within LMEs as well as a system of professional training 
dominated by general purpose degrees paid for by individuals or governments.14 
 
The institutional framework of Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) 
In contrast to LMEs, CMEs are characterized by stakeholder systems of corporate 
governance.  Stakeholders in companies include management, employers and the unions that 
often represent them, banks, and other shareholders.  The system is characterized by greater 
employee loyalty and more solidarity and consensus-building between employees and 
management.  This stakeholder system of corporate governance, coupled with strong labor market 
regulation, promote long-term employment.  Within large firms, managers and skilled personnel 
usually enjoy long-term employment, often after an apprenticeship or internship.  In most CMEs, 
organized labor also enjoys power on supervisory boards as well as through formal consultative 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. P. 29. 
 
14
 Culpepper, Pepper D. (2003). Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe. 
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rights over training, work organization, and hiring to obtain unlimited employment contracts.  
The main repercussion for this type of company organization, then, is that managers must try to 
create a broad consensus across the firm when major decisions will be made.  Unilateral decision-
making is limited, and it is difficult for senior managers to create high-powered incentives for 
individual employees.  Performance rewards are targeted at groups rather than individuals, and 
bonus schemes are limited.  Another implication is that career structures become well-defined and 
are primarily based on education and experience within the firm rather than on short-term 
performance.  Promotions occur based on seniority and educational credentials rather than on 
short-term individual performance.15 
Corporate governance rules also affect financial relationships and ownership within 
CMEs.  Financial relationships in CMEs are characterized by bank or credit-based financial 
systems.  Companies can obtain loans for long-term investments so that assets can be easily 
secured, such as land, capital investments, mergers, and acquisitions.  However, funding for 
riskier investments, such as the human capital intensive R&D common in technology start-ups, is 
more limited; companies in CMEs must rely on retained earnings for such investments.16  In 
addition to a funding role, banks and other large financial actors (e.g. insurance companies) can 
also have a strong oversight role on firms through seats on supervisory boards and through 
continuing ownership ties in public companies.  Thus, banks in CMEs adopt a long-term focus in 
part because they know that firms are able to offer long-term commitments to employees and 
other stakeholders in the firm, and because they can often monitor the status of their investments 
through seats on supervisory boards.17 
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 Casper, Steven (2007). Creating Silicon Valley in Europe: Public Policy towards New Technology 
Industries. P. 29. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Deeg, Richard (1999). Finance Capitalism: Banks and the German Political Economy. 
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Lastly, heavy labor market regulation and long-term investing strategies by stakeholders 
in CMEs favor the development of firm-specific knowledge investments in employees that are 
not easily transferrable to other firms.  These investments include extensive in-house vocational 
training following long apprenticeships or internships.  Such arrangements tend to lock-in 
owners, managers, and skilled employees into long-term, organized relationships.  Labor market 
regulations, such as legal obstacles to hire-and-fire, combined with consultative patters of work 
organization, thus favor competence-enhancing human resource policies.  Within CMEs 
management must treat employees as a fixed rather than as a variable cost, and thus there is a 
strong interest in developing long-term career structures for all skilled employees.18 
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 Streeck, Wolfgang (1984). Industrial Relations in West Germany: A Case Study of the Car Industry. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Comparative Institutional Advantage and Radical Innovation in Europe 
Each model of company organization thus possesses benefits and constraints when it 
comes to fostering technological innovation.  Could it be true, then, that the CME institutional 
framework puts European states at a comparative disadvantage with the more liberal-market 
oriented United States?  This is certainly what Peter Hall and David Soskice argue in their 
comparative institutional advantage theory.19  For these two political scientists, the pro-
stakeholder corporate governance, the rigidity of labor markets, and the conservatism of the 
financial sector common to continental European states all contribute to the lack of an 
entrepreneurial and risk-taking culture that rewards individual performance.  Instead, argue Hall 
and Soskice, the more regulative and organized national institutional model of CME stakeholder 
capitalism allows companies to pursue successful long-term, “incremental innovation” strategies 
within medium-technology industries, such as engineering, automobiles, and chemicals, due to its 
reliance on widespread industrial training and collaborative workplaces that are hard to sustain in 
the more short-term, shareholder-dominated liberal market model.  In turn, LMEs lack 
appropriate institutions to support long-term success in these industries, leading to poorer 
performance in those areas, yet the natural access to venture capital, high-powered incentives and 
flexible labor markets means that the more radically innovative industries (e.g. biotechnology, 
information technology, and software) flourish in this system.  Likewise, CMEs, given their 
adversity to high-risk finance, short-term employment and high-powered incentives for 
individuals, lack the elements necessary to support project-based firms pursuing failure-prone
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 Hall, Peter A. and Soskice, David (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. Pp. 375-378. 
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technology strategies.  Due to long-term employment expectations, consensus decision-making, 
and a lack of investment capital for risky ventures, most large firms within CMEs invest in 
cumulative, “incremental,” technology that is less likely to fail. 
What does this mean for the place of Silicon Valley radical innovation in Europe?  
National institutional frameworks within CMEs clearly create obstacles to radically-innovative 
start-ups.  For one, obtaining high-risk financing for start-up projects is difficult in CMEs.  
Capital markets within CMEs are underdeveloped and focus on large, established companies with 
predictable revenues.  This severely limits the viability of IPOs for new technology companies, 
particularly during the early stages when earnings and profits are limited and most investment is 
poured into R&D.  Therefore, venture capitalists (VCs) would lack a reliable method to liquidate 
successful investments quickly.  VCs must therefore take a longer-term perspective, liquidating 
poorly performing companies and then waiting long periods for shareholdings within successful 
firms to become liquid through a friendly acquisition or an IPO.  VCs in CMEs thus cannot adopt 
portfolio investments that promise relatively short-term returns, and the illiquidity of shares also 
dampens further outside investment funding.20 
Stakeholder systems of company law also create obstacles to the normal VC-dominated 
governance styles of technology start-ups.  Firstly, the norm of taking into account the opinions 
of stakeholders in the decision-making process means that boards, owners, and other shareholders 
are denied the flexibility to execute the decisions they think are best.  Secondly, such cooperative 
system of governance might detract many VCs who hope to have a decisive voice in company 
affairs from investing.  Lastly, even if start-ups imitate the Silicon Valley model of governance at 
first, as firms grow, consensus-based company governance take place in these developing 
companies.  When firms start seeking IPOs, they must adopt company law structures mandated 
for public companies, which undoubtedly include employee representation in all CMEs. 
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A rigid labor market also presents many obstacles for technology start-ups in CMEs.  
First, long-term employment strategies used by large firms within CMEs limit the ability of start-
ups with substantial failure risks to recruit experienced managers and skilled personnel and also 
limit “hire-and-fire” strategies” used to manage technological viability.  Second, compared to an 
LME, the risk of moving to a start-up is substantial in CMEs.  If most individuals expect to be 
employed by one company for a long time, they will not be actively seeking jobs.  An individual 
leaving a “safe” job has no guarantee that he/she will find employment there again if the start-up 
which he/she joined failed.  In addition, there is also the risk that upon moving firms, his/her 
firm-specific skills will be devalued.  CME labor regulation thus limits the size and growth of 
labor markets for skilled personnel. 
Lastly, the difficulty of providing high-powered incentives for individuals also does 
much to limit the success of technology start-ups in CMEs.  This is due to the fact that start-ups in 
CMEs must design incentive schemes for employees in the shadow of the practices and norms of 
large firms within the economy.  Large firms within CMEs avoid creating high-powered 
incentives for managers, unilateral decision-making structures, and opportunities for rapid career 
advancement because these organizational structures go against the logic of established 
institutional frameworks and would risk alienating long-term stakeholders to the firms.21  Yet if 
they wish to lure away skilled personnel from more established competition such as large firms or 
the public sector, start-ups have to offer incentives strong enough to make the risk of leaving a 
“safe” position worthwhile. 
 
The Possibilities for Radical Innovation in Europe 
Given all the institutional framework obstacles to radical innovation within CMEs, is it 
possible to foster world-beating radically innovative industries in continental European CMEs?  
As mentioned before, scholars who favor the varieties of capitalism approach argue that 
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institutions within CMEs advantage more cumulative (incremental) technological trajectories in 
which long-term employee commitment and training and so-called patient finance is important.  
Sustained patterns of vocational training within firms, consensual decision-making, long-term 
employment, and patient finance are all linked to the systematic exploitation of particular 
technologies in a number of medium technologies characteristic of many engineering and 
chemical markets.  Yet while conventional varieties of capitalism scholarship would argue that 
LMEs and CMEs possess comparative advantage in certain economic sectors and therefore 
complement each other better than they compete, one could also argue that management practices 
and entrepreneurial cultures have as much to do with technological innovation as institutional 
frameworks.  A more comprehensive approach would thus include both institutional frameworks 
and policies designed to improve financial incentives and labor mobility as well as to develop an 
entrepreneur-friendly environment. 
One of the principal policies associated with the success of the Silicon Valley model is 
the widespread use of ownership share options.  Options may also be viable within CMEs, in that 
they create a collective incentive across all employees of the firm; if the firm becomes publicly 
listed and thereafter sees its share price increase, then all owners of the firm profit.  If senior 
management of companies can credibly disperse share options as a tool to reward individual 
performance, they could create high-powered incentives as seen within LMEs.  Small companies 
in their start-up phase seem more likely to do this, as they are farthest removed from employee 
representation laws that tend to conduce toward lower powered, collective employee incentives. 
An obstacle for CMEs promoting radical innovation that can be solved through public 
policy is the lack of employee mobility. While national institutional frameworks within CMEs 
clearly create labor market and corporate governance obstacles to start-ups, it is possible to 
develop regional technology clusters and sustain patterns of flexible labor market coordination in 
CMEs that are more conducive to flexible personnel policies within technology start-ups.  Unlike 
LMEs, where deregulated labor markets make inter-firm mobility naturally high, within CMEs 
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start-ups must circumvent dominant patterns of labor market coordination and career 
management.22  Regional clusters, such as Cambridge’s Silicon Fen and France’s Sophia 
Antipolis, can overcome this obstacle by building on successfully intertwined networks of 
managers, skilled personnel, and investors.23 
Lastly, some scholars argue that the regulatory and administrative environment of CMEs 
within which firms operate can be enhanced through public policy.  Regulations regarding stock 
options, as mentioned before, can be amended so that these may be used as a high-powered 
incentive for skilled personnel, but one could also amend the tax environment in which firms 
operate.  In addition, public policy can support research linked to important technological 
innovations through large sums of state funding.  Meanwhile, the administrative burden on small 
firms can also be lightened through reform.  All of these options can and have been tried to some 
extent in European CMEs, and there is much evidence of its success in certain cases, pointing to 
the fact that radical innovation, while not natural to coordinated economies, can be supported 
through policy activism. 
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Radical Innovation and the Transformation of French Institutions 
An interesting case study for the viability of radical innovation in CMEs is France.  This 
section will demonstrate how institutions in France have adapted to market demands in order to 
facilitate radical innovation in a corporatist market framework.  I concentrate on France as it is a 
major representative of corporatist states in Europe.  This study will draw heavily on the works of 
Elisabetta Bertero, Pepper Culpepper, Michel Goyer, Trumbull Gunnar, Mary O’Sullivan, Vivien 
Schmidt and others who have written extensively on the transformation of French corporate 
governance in the 1990s and early in the millennium as well as on the changes in corporate 
governance in the past two decades in general.  These academics point out that the French 
corporate regime has morphed substantially to facilitate research and innovation for companies 
and universities.  French reforms have also focused on increasing the access of technological 
start-ups to venture capital and other sources of private equity.  In addition, the French financial 
market has become more market-oriented in order to serve the needs of firms that are conducting 
more and more research into radical innovation fields.  From the French experience, we hope to 
discern whether a Silicon Valley is a possibility in Europe. 
Reform of French innovation policy first emerged in the mid-1990, and these changes 
had to overcome a French tradition of state involvement in the economy.  The French state 
historically played a central role in developing and commercializing new technologies.  In 
addition, the state was also the primary sponsor and user of new technologies.  The new 
technologies served the power and purposes of the state in two ways.  First, their complexity 
meant that firms required extensive government support in the promotion of new research.  The 
elite Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) created a network of research labs 
intended to support basic research in the national interest.  Therefore, through CNRS the postwar 
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French state was able to direct the development of new technologies.  Secondly, the 
technologies often had explicit national goals.  Military research allowed France to manufacture 
advanced weapons.  Space launch technology gave France worldwide surveillance capabilities.  
And an aggressive nuclear power program allowed France to reduce its energy dependency on the 
Middle East.   These new technologies thus served to concentrate and reinforce the French state’s 
control over key sectors of the economy.24  Meanwhile, large firms cooperated willingly because 
of the complexity of their projects.  French industrial innovation projects had been ambitious and 
largely successful because of high levels of government financial and research support for large 
state-run companies that carried them out.  Thus Airbus (commercial aircraft), Dassault (military 
jets), Areva (nuclear reactors) and Groupe Bull (computers) all succeeded in the post-war 
economy because of their collaboration with the French state.  Large firms were favored over 
smaller ones, since the latter presumably lacked the market power and economies of scale 
necessary to promote economic efficiency. 
The features of the French political economy that so closely aligned the interests of the 
technology sector and the state also posed challenges for promoting innovation in the new 
information and communications sectors.  France’s tradition of state-initiated innovation tended 
to concentrate France’s technical elite within the state-run sectors.  Those with the greatest 
capacity for technological innovation were mainly working for the government.  Secondly, the 
success of earlier government-funded innovation projects had led French citizens to associate 
innovation with government initiative, yet the rapid pace of technological and market 
development in the new information and communication technologies (ICT) did not favor 
government initiatives but rather small and flexible start-ups.  Thirdly, the dominant role of the 
central government had weakened local authorities that could have promoted decentralized 
private-sector innovation projects.  France’s postwar economic trajectory concentrated expertise, 
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political responsibility, and institutional capacity at the state level.25  This posed real problems for 
cultivating technology-intensive innovation in small firms. 
French politicians expressed great concern about whether their country could adopt the 
institutions necessary to promote high-tech start-ups without importing all of American-style 
capitalism.  France possessed few of the necessary liberal economic institutions associated with 
information and communication revolutions.  France’s civil code legal system and strong 
regulatory tradition, for example, placed brakes on company creation and failure, while “Anglo-
Saxon” common law legal system and its tradition of laissez-faire regulation imposed low costs 
on company creation and failure.  Many also believed that moving to a decentralized model of 
innovation required risky changes in policy.  This high level of risk would drive a rapid cycle of 
company formation and failure that would challenge France’s traditional emphasis on job security 
and the socialization of risk.  In addition, the French public feared that high-powered incentives 
necessary to draw scientists and investors into risky ventures would widen inequalities.  France’s 
efforts to promote a French Silicon Valley therefore generated a heated political debate focused 
on its compatibility with France’s social contract.26 
 
Reasons Behind France’s New Innovation Push 
Despite the risks, French innovation policy underwent radical changes.  The new 
emphasis on promoting high-tech start-ups in France addressed two economic concerns: France’s 
poor performance in new economy sectors, the loss of skilled workers, and high unemployment.  
With regards to the first, French leadership was responding to concerns over an apparent 
innovation lag in France.  By the 1990s, France had issued fewer patents and possessed relatively 
fewer researchers than most of its OECD partners (5.9 percent of the workforce, compared to 7.4 
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percent in the US and 8.3 percent in Japan).27  The government was particularly concerned about 
innovation in the high-technology sectors, like ICT and biotechnology.  The lack of commercial 
success of French start-ups in these fields was particularly worrying.  French science research 
prospered, but entrepreneurs failed to translate laboratory findings into commercially viable 
technologies.  Commercialization of these new technologies appeared to depend on the context of 
new and dynamic firms funded through private venture capital and other non-government 
sources.  Also, both ICT and biotechnology sectors appeared to rely on small, dynamic firms to 
create and commercialize new products.  France needed both private money and small firms. 
France in the late 1990s also confronted concerns about a brain drain.  The number of 
French citizens living abroad had grown, from 1.64 million in 1995 to 1.78 million in 1998.  Over 
half of those lived in other countries in Western Europe, and 20 percent had moved to the U.S.28  
This trend was of particular concern to France’s leaders because the emigrants were 
overwhelmingly young and highly educated; France’s technically trained elite was increasingly 
moving to join vibrant start-ups that were developing overseas.  In addition, the flight of France’s 
technically skilled youth also represented a loss of tax revenue.  At the same time, the most 
highly educated graduates who remained in France continued to favor traditional career paths.  A 
preference for pursuing a professional career with an established employer was strongly felt.  
Apart from providing a stable source of income, France’s largest employers—including the 
state—offered a position of status in French society.  Preoccupied by a growing technology lag, 
and driven by the fear of losing highly trained technicians to foreign firms or to the civil service, 
France was determined to create a domestic analog to Silicon Valley. 
Lastly, the prospect of new job creation that the small-firm sector offered was also 
attractive.  Newly-created firms in technology sectors were seen as a particularly important 
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source of new jobs by Jospin’s administration.  And that faith was well-placed, since a 1995 study 
showed that technology companies formed by researchers created three times as many new jobs 
as did other kinds of new companies.29  The promotion of a new high-technology sector 
dominated by successful small firms offered not only the prospect of rapid new job creation, but 
also a set of new high-wage, high-skill jobs. 
 
Policy Activism in Support of Technology Start-Ups 
Although reform faced many challenges given the nature of the CME-like institutional 
framework in place in France, support came from three places.  First, the governments in power 
supported reform as a way to increase their visibility in ending France’s unemployment and brain 
drain problems.  Second, technocrats in France’s civil service, many of them engineers from the 
Ecole Polytechnique, also enthusiastically supported the revolution in information technology in 
French government services in the late 1990s.  Lastly, entrepreneurs supported government 
activism in innovation, not least because they hoped that government policy would facilitate 
research into new technologies as well as increased dissemination of technology into market 
products.  Consequently, many entrepreneurs joined Croissance Plus, a new advocacy group 
designed to impose a new model and culture of entrepreneurship in the country.30 
In order to remain economically competitive against the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the co-habitation government of President Jacques Chirac and Premier Lionel Jospin 
put in place a vast array of new policies designed to promote new information and 
communications technologies in France that were both efficient and as inexpensive as possible.   
These changes included substantial reform of the regulatory framework within which small start-
ups operated to encourage entrepreneurship, the growth of private resources available for R&D 
and initial funding of technology start-ups, a stronger public sector commitment to research, the 
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decreasing of the administrative burden imposed on small companies, the improvement of 
government-business communication through technology, and the creation of public 
infrastructure to support key technological fields. 
The first important sphere which the French government reformed through its innovation 
policies was the regulatory framework available to entrepreneurs.  Starting in the mid-1980s, 
French policymakers worked to create an entrepreneuriat, a new class of risk-taking, educated 
business leaders who would promote new company creation in high-tech sectors.  One prominent 
program aimed at the entrepreneur class, called Aide aux chômeurs ou repreneurs d’entreprises 
(Aid to Unemployed Founders of Companies, ACCRE), granted a special exoneration from social 
security payments to the formerly unemployed who chose to start their own businesses.  Started 
in 1984, the program had a noticeable impact on firm creation, with a 2001 survey of company 
owners reporting that 36.2 of them had been unemployed before they created a new company.31  
Yet subsequent government increasingly saw ACCRE as an inefficient way to encourage new 
company formation.  Especially in new technology sectors, entrepreneurship appeared to require 
high levels of skill, expertise, and creativity. 
France’s new focus of high-tech start-ups therefore shifted to a strategy of cultivating 
entrepreneurship among France’s most technically skilled workers: those who took jobs either in 
government labs or in France’s largest companies.  This was a challenge since French corporate 
governance still lacked the high-powered incentives for employees of start-ups common to 
LMEs.  It was little wonder, then, that France’s highly trained elites went from elite grandes 
écoles into secure positions in the R&D departments of large established firms.  The Jospin 
government hoped to lure technically skilled personnel out of safe government or industry 
positions by providing the possibility for attractive compensation to offset the risks of 
entrepreneurship.  The primary strategy focused on reforming the regulation of stock options.  
French policymakers believed that stock options were a valuable tool in compensating 
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entrepreneurs for the high risks associated with creating new start-ups, thus creating a high-
powered incentive to support the development of small technology firms.  In addition, stock 
options could be used to align management interests with those of shareholders, and thus give 
managers a personal interest in raising the value of the company. 
The first step towards reforming stock option regulation centered on creating a favorable 
tax status for stock options and removing a ceiling on the number of options any individual 
employee could receive.  Edouard Balladur achieved this during Chirac’s first term, and he thus 
opened the way to use stock options as a component of executive compensation.  But in 1992, 
stock option liberalization was revoked when Jean Artius, Juppé’s finance minister, raised the tax 
on stock-option earnings .32  In 1997 Alain Juppé also increased the social contributions due on 
stock options by raising the tax on capital gains on stocks to 40 percent held for over five years 
and to 54 percent during the time period before.33  Then the government of Jospin proposed 
reversing this trend toward overtaxing stock options.  In 1999, Dominique Strauss-Kahn (DSK), 
Jospin’s finance minister, proposed lowering the tax rate on stock options to 26 percent, equal to 
the standard tax rate for all capital gains in France.  He also proposed reducing the mandatory 
holding period required to receive this favorable tax treatment from five to three years.  To ensure 
transparency, companies would be required to list managers receiving stock-option packages so 
that share-holders could monitor their levels of compensation.  French companies had by that 
time become heavy users of stock options, with 93 percent of CAC40 companies offering stock-
option plans and CAC40 company employees exercising €2.6 billion worth of stock options in 
1999; these figures made France the second largest user of stock options in the world, behind 
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only the United States.34  Yet despite their popularity and wide spread use, stock options were 
still regarded with suspicion in France since they could lead to excessive compensation packages 
for top executives.  In the end, Strauss-Kahn’s plans were scuttled because Meder, France’s 
largest employer association, opposed the legislation on grounds of lack of transparency. 
In anticipation of such strong political opposition, Strauss-Kahn made plans for a similar 
compensation instrument.  Nearly identical in function to the traditional stock option, the new 
instrument, the Bons de souscription de parts de créateurs d’entreprise (BSPCE), were highly 
restrictive in their application.  They were available to companies less than seven years old, with 
75 percent individual ownership, and that were not yet traded on a stock market.  The 1999 law 
on innovation and research extended the BSPCE considerably, and by 2002 they applied to 
companies up to fifteen years old, with only 2.5 percent individual ownership, and traded on any 
of Europe’s high-tech stock exchanges.  For entrepreneurs, the BSPCE offered a workable 
solution for a critical need.   More important, this novel stock option format allowed the political 
left and right to come together around a consensus that compensation was acceptable in the 
context of genuine risk-taking.35 
Another place in which the French government mobilized political support was in the 
cultivation of private resources for risk investment.  Among the primary sources for private 
investment was to be the French citizen.  In an effort to tap France’s high savings rate to promote 
technological innovation, the Juppé government proposed tax incentives for ordinary French 
households to invest in venture capital in 1996.  The so-called Fonds communs de placement dans 
l’innovation (Mutual Funds Invested in Innovation, FCPI) offered tax advantages for individual 
investors who placed their funds in highly innovative firms.  These funds, run by private fund 
managers, were required to invest 60 percent of their capital in medium-sized firms focused on 
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innovation that were either not publicly listed or listed on France’s high-tech stock market, the 
Nouveau Marché.  The terms of the FCPI were fiscally attractive.  If the FCPI was held for five 
years, earnings and value added were exempt from tax, although they were susceptible to a 10 
percent social contribution.  To qualify for these exemptions, target companies had to show that 
they were “intensely innovating,” and this could be shown by companies through spending at 
least one-third of their revenues over three consecutive years on R&D or, for younger companies, 
by receiving certification from the state innovation agency, the Agence nationale pour la 
valorisation de la recherche now Agence française de l’innovation (ANVAR).  ANVAR became 
a gatekeeper for private funding to new innovative companies.  Of all high-tech start-ups created 
in France between 1987 and 1999, 84 percent had enjoyed ANVAR support, and out of these, 70 
percent stayed in business for at least ten years.  In addition to the private funds it raised, the 
FCPI program raised a new generation of venture capital fund managers, many of which were 
recruited from the private sector or from the civil service.36 
Despite the rise of the individual investor, the bulk of French private equity for 
innovation would still come from traditional institutional investors.  Some of these institutional 
investors, like private pension funds, were foreign and thus often negatively depicted because of 
perceptions that they favored shareholder value over employment security.  Yet the bulk of 
private equity investment was to come from French banks.  Banks had always funded French 
innovation, often through direct loans to start-ups that were guaranteed by the state.  For example, 
the state-owned Banque du Développement des Petites et Moyennes Entreprise (Development 
Bank for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise, BDPME) offered guaranteed funding, and 
commercial banks were also increasingly investing in venture capital funds.   Private banks like 
Crédit Agricole also created their own funds (Crédit Agricole Création) to fund start-up projects 
so as to not miss out on important investment opportunities. 
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A third and increasingly important institutional source of capital for French start-ups was 
France’s large corporations.  Liberalization of French corporate governance and the decline of 
bank-funded innovation for France’s large technology firms forced them to adopt more cost-
effective approaches to innovation.  Often this simply meant acquiring companies as a means of 
obtaining new technologies.  For truly new technologies or markets, however, French companies 
increasingly began taking equity stakes in small start-ups, especially those pursuing work in areas 
related to their own core businesses.  To this end, many of France’s large technology firms 
created their own corporate venture capital funds.  Large companies with their own venture 
capital branches included Schneider and Pinault-Printemps-Rédoute (PPR).37 
At the same time that the private sector was investing heavily in radical technology, the 
French state solidified its commitment to innovation and research.  In 1998, Dominique Strauss-
Kahn allocated €153 million from the sale of France Télécom stock to create a fund that would 
promote high-tech sectors in France.  Indeed one of the reasons for the partial privatization of 
France Télécom had been precisely to raise funds that could be invested in new technologies.  A 
large share of these funds, €91 million, went to a government-funded venture capital program: the 
Fonds public pour le capital risqué (Public Funds for Venture Capital, FPCR).  This money was 
supplemented by €46 million from the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the combined €137 
million fund was managed by France’s state financial institution, the Caisse des Dépots et 
Consignations (CDC).38  And the FCPR was only one of several domestic investment fund 
structures provided by the French state.  Today, France also provides fiscal incentives for private 
equity and venture capital investments through the Fond Commun de Placement dans 
l’Innovation (FCPI), and the Fond d’Investissement de Proximité (FIP).39 
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The French state also provides several fiscal incentives for business R&D expenditures 
and capital expenditure, cooperation between firms and universities/research institutes, and for 
the creation or spin-out of innovative firms from parent firms.  Key among these is the Crédit 
d’impot recherché (CIR), which applies to expenses related to R&D operations and since 2008 
amounts to 30% of research expenses lower than or equal to €100 million, and 5% of research 
expenses above this threshold.  The expenses cover human and material resources dedicated to an 
eligible R&D program, such as staff expenditures and subcontracting costs.  France was also the 
first European country to launch a fiscal incentive scheme to support young and innovative 
companies in 2004, the Jeune Entreprise Innovante (JEI) scheme.  The state provides a special 
company tax rate of 15% for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the first €38,120 of 
profits, with any excess taxed at the standard rate.40  Lastly, the 1999 Law on Innovation and 
Research eliminated the restriction that prohibited public researchers from taking a stake in a 
private company.  It also permitted employees to take a congé creation d’entreprise (company 
creation holiday), granting up to six years’ leave of absence, including social security coverage, 
with a guarantee of receiving one’s old job upon return.41 
Another key area which the French government prioritized was lowering administrative 
barriers to new firm creation.  France had long been criticized for bureaucratic excess and 
regulation, and this was increasingly a problem for company formation.  Therefore, the state’s 
reforms took two forms.  The first, more ambitious reform sought to lower the administrative 
burden of company interaction with the French government.  One of the greatest burdens faced by 
French companies was submitting reports to the government on the status of their business and 
work force.  Ninety percent of all reports sent by companies to the government were mandatory 
labor- and welfare-related declarations.  Company registration was also slow, as it took about 15 
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weeks to register a company in France in 1999, compared with at most eight weeks in Germany, 
four in Britain and two in the United States.42  This burden of paperwork fell disproportionately 
on small employers without specialized accounting departments, as well as on heads of new 
companies.  Not only was the administrative burden for new companies an impediment to 
entrepreneurs, it also might have depressed hiring among small firms who did not want to deal 
with the excessive paperwork involved in the process.43  Red tape thus stifled entrepreneurship. 
France’s effort to reduce the administrative burden on small companies focused less on 
deregulation and more on streamlining business interaction with the government.  For instance, 
the Jospin administration opened regional offices across France to consolidate the procedures for 
registering new companies.  These Centres de formalités des enterprises (Centers for Company 
Procedures, CFE) were located in regional chambers of commerce and were designed to 
centralize advice and paperwork dealing with French companies.  These guichet uniques, or 
single access points, for business-government interaction provided all the information necessary 
to create or modify a legal corporation, thus substantially speeding up company registrations.44 
The Internet and e-government facilities proved especially useful for implementing the 
guichet unique strategy.  The French government aggressively embraced the Internet in the hope 
of easing the administrative burden on companies and individuals.  The government website 
www.service-publique.fr made almost all government forms and information available online.  
By embracing the use of electronic means for registration paperwork, the French government 
greatly simplified the company creation process and even drew favor from unions and small 
business associations for this simplification.  These rapid advances put France at the forefront of 
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e-government.45  One reason e-government was pursued so successfully was that it allowed the 
government to ease the administrative burden on small companies both at a low cost and without 
instituting a politically difficult program of deregulation. 
A second legal reform that was introduced by the Jospin government was a new flexible 
type of company, the Société par action simplifié (simplified stock company, SAS), adapted to 
the needs of technological start-ups.46 This new type of company differed markedly from the two 
common legal forms of company existing in France at the time: the Société anonyme (SA) and the 
Société a responsabilité limité (SARL).  For both of these types of companies, government 
regulation set the precise relationship between owners, managers, and shareholders.  At the time, 
most start-ups were being formed as limited-liability SARLs.   Therefore, the government first 
started its reforms by lowering the costs of creating this latter type of company, which would now 
be spread over five years.  Also, social payments by new SARLs were reduced by 30 percent for 
the first year and 15 percent during the second year of operation. 
However, the SARL corporate form limited shareholder control over management.  Many 
feared that this separation could be damaging to high-technology start-ups, whose potential 
creditors, in particular venture capitalists, might invest only if the y could partially guide the 
decision-making process of the new company.  With this in mind, the Jospin administration 
created a new legal form for high-tech start-ups, a variant of the SAS.  This form of joint-stock 
company was established to provide established companies with the framework for undertaking 
collaborative projects.  The Loi sur l’innovation et la recherché of 1999 (Law on Innovation and 
Research) created a revamped SAS for technology start-ups that could be formed by individual 
entrepreneurs.47  Although the new SAS was limited to privately-owned companies that could not 
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issue stock publicly, the “technology” SAS offered other advantages.  It permitted companies to 
create their own rules for management and stockholders.  This allowed different classes of shares 
to be granted different voting rights, a necessary condition to attract initial rounds of venture 
capital.  Furthermore, the new SAS format allowed new start-ups to issue stock options, 
something not permitted under the SARL format.  Finally, the new SAS format eliminated work 
councils in company management, thereby streamlining decision-making.48 
In addition to enhancing the corporate framework, the private funding, and the 
administrative environment in which start-ups operated, the government also provided public 
infrastructure for start-ups.  Jospin’s government tried to rationalize the system of government 
research centers in order to create better communication among communities of researchers, 
entrepreneurs, and industrialists working with similar technologies.  Their goal was to place 
researchers and practitioners in close contact with one another, so that new ideas could cross the 
boundary from laboratory to industry. French restructuring supported two different visions of 
technology transfer: the idea of the research network, and the model of the technology park.  Both 
approaches were designed to bring together state research labs and private companies working in 
related fields of technology.  With regards to the former, the Jospin government set out to create 
sixteen innovation networks that linked existing researchers with industry, by sector.  The 
network model was embodied in the new Réseaux de recherché et d’innovation technologique 
(Networks for Research and Technological Innovation, RRIT).  The goal of these networks was 
to help direct government research funds to worthy projects.  In the absence of an independent 
agency, like the National Science Foundation, to distribute research funds, the RRITs played the 
role of such an agency.  By 2002, France had created thirteen of these networks, all in technical 
fields in which the government believed important commercial advances could be made.49 
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A second effort emphasized the importance of technology clusters, technopôles, in 
promoting the skills, infrastructure, and communication necessary for technical innovation.  
Existing and new research facilities were grouped by technological fields into twelve technology 
research centers throughout France.  These technology parks were the site of collaboration 
between government labs and national champions pursuing major technological projects.  
Toulouse, for instance, became a major center of French aerospace research and activities.  
Grenoble became the center of French semiconductor research through government collaboration 
with Thomson-CSF.50  These technopôles were integrated into a new set of Centres nationaux de 
recherche technologique (National Centers for Technological Research, CNRT).  Unlike the 
research networks, these new CNRTs were intended to promote technologies requiring expensive 
platform technologies.  They also provided a way to balance concerns about regional 
development in France with the new technology incentives of the government.  Lastly, they 
provided a cluster of interaction within which formal and informal networks of innovation could 
be formed, thus injecting some flexibility into skilled personnel markets. 
All of these reforms had a positive effect on the success of radical innovation firms in 
France.  For example, since the 1990s the environment for technological innovation in France has 
improved significantly.  By 2008 the country was ranked first in Europe for access to venture 
capital and other sources of private equity for investment.  The overall tax and legal environment 
for financial innovation investments in France is also very favorable.  Pension funds and 
insurance companies are free to invest in assets, and many therefore invest in technology firms 
that are looking for funding or that are listed on the Nouveau Marché.  In addition, France offers a 
good environment to incentivize companies to innovate, and R&D incentives are also available.51  
Perhaps most importantly, France now ranks 6th on INSEAD’s Global Innovation Index for the 
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speed of starting up a business and 4th for the overall quality of infrastructure that it offers its 
innovating companies, results that speak volumes about the reforms.52 
There is much debate among academics of French corporate governance about the 
implications of institutional change.  The idea that the French financial system in the early 21st 
century has undergone a systemic shift towards an outsider, market-oriented system is often 
found in academic and popular discourse.  Goyer, for example, argues that the “transformation of 
the French system of corporate governance is nothing short of impressive: in less than a decade, 
France shifted from an insider to an outsider model.”53  From this perspective, state control has 
decreased and the demands of financial markets, especially those of foreign institutional 
investors, now strongly influence the actions of French corporations.  Therefore, it would seem 
that France has developed a financial system similar to that of an LME.  If this interpretation is 
correct, the question that naturally arises is whether the rest of French capitalism is in tune with 
this shift.  Schmidt, in contrast, rejects the notion that French capitalism has become systemically 
incoherent as a result of the transformation of its financial institutions.  She argues that “while 
France’s state capitalism has been transformed through market-oriented reforms, it has become 
neither market capitalist nor managed capitalist.  Rather, it has moved from ‘state-led’ capitalism 
to a ‘state-enhanced’ capitalism, in which the state still plays an active albeit much reduced 
role.”54  This study supports the latter view, but does not rule out the possibility that marketplace 
demands might have supremacy over certain decisions.
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Conclusions: Radical Innovation in CMEs? 
Despite all the institutional framework obstacles to radical innovation within CMEs, it is 
possible to spur radically innovative industries within the confines of that framework.  This paper 
has provided a concrete example of this through the case study on France.  By enhancing the 
corporate framework in which technology start-ups operate, increasing the private funding 
options on which they depend, decreasing the administrative burden that stifles them, and 
supporting them both with public infrastructure and with government funds and fiscal incentives, 
France has succeeded in creating a welcoming environment for technology entrepreneurs within a 
traditionally corporatist state.  In addition, the traditional patterns of vocational training within 
firms, consensual decision-making, long-term employment, and patient finance linked to the 
systematic exploitation of particular technologies still exist alongside radically innovative 
technologies and the framework in which they operate. 
Thus, some of the aspects associated with the Silicon Valley model can be adopted by 
CMEs.  Stock options may be viable within CMEs, provided that they create a collective 
incentive across all employees of the firm.  Labor mobility, though not legally enshrined, can be 
somewhat achieved through the clustering of firms and research as well as through the creation of 
high-powered incentives (stock options) to attract state and/or large firm employees. Lastly, 
public policy can enhance regulatory and administrative environments in the favor of 
technological start-ups.  Tax laws can be amended, research and fiscal support granted, private 
sources of venture capital and private equity can be identified and harnessed, and bureaucratic 
procedures simplified.  All of these options have been tried in several CMEs.  These systems have 
innovated in an atmosphere that afforded them a different kind of comparative institutional 
advantage.  The lesson is thus clear.  If the Lisbon Agenda goals are to be met at any point in the
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next few years, it is imperative that Europe’s CMEs keep producing imaginative and innovative 
public policy that will allow them to support technology start-ups and the entrepreneurs and 
institutions behind them. 
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